In this paper we present a new key establishment protocol based on the decomposition problem in non-commutative groups which is: given two elements w, w1 of the platform group G and two subgroups A, B ⊆ G (not necessarily distinct), find elements a ∈ A, b ∈ B such that w1 = awb. Here we introduce two new ideas that improve the security of key establishment protocols based on the decomposition problem. In particular, we conceal (i.e., do not publish explicitly) one of the subgroups A, B, thus introducing an additional computationally hard problem for the adversary, namely, finding the centralizer of a given finitely generated subgroup.
Introduction
In search of a more efficient and/or secure alternative to established cryptographic protocols (such as RSA), several authors have come up with public key establishment protocols as well as with complete public key cryptosystems based on allegedly hard search problems from combinatorial (semi)group theory, including the conjugacy search problem [1, 15] , the homomorphism search problem [14] , [18] , the decomposition search problem [5, 15, 17] , the subgroup membership search problem [19] .
In this paper, we focus on the decomposition search problem which we subsequently call just the decomposition problem. The problem is: given two elements w, w 1 of the platform group G and two subgroups A, B ⊆ G (not necessarily distinct), find elements a ∈ A, b ∈ B such that w 1 = awb.
It is straightforward to arrange a key establishment protocol based on this problem (see [5, 15, 17] ), assuming that ab = ba for any a ∈ A, b ∈ B:
(0) One of the parties (say, Alice) publishes a random element w ∈ G (the "base" element).
(1) Alice chooses a 1 , a 2 ∈ A (Alice's private keys) and sends a 1 wa 2 to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses b 1 , b 2 ∈ B (Bob's private keys) and sends b 1 wb 2 to Alice.
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If a i b i = b i a i , then K a = K b in G. Thus Alice and Bob have a shared secret key.
Security of such a protocol will, of course, depend on a particular platform group G (at the very least, G has to be non-commutative). It appears that for braid groups (which are a popular choice for the platform), the so-called length attacks present a serious threat, see e.g. [8, 12, 13, 16] .
In this paper, we introduce two new ideas that improve the security of key establishment protocols based on the decomposition problem:
(i) We conceal one of the subgroups A, B.
(ii) We make Alice choose her left private key a 1 from one of the subgroups A, B, and her right private key a 2 from the other subgroup. Same for Bob.
These two improvements together will obviously foil any length attacks. We give a complete description of our protocol in the following Section 2; here we just sketch the main idea.
Let G be a group and g ∈ G. Denote by C G (g) the centralizer of g in G, i.e., the set of elements h ∈ G such that hg = gh. For S = {g 1 , . . . , g k } ⊆ G, C G (g 1 , . . . , g k ) denotes the centralizer of S in G, which is the intersection of the centralizers C G (g i ), i = 1, ..., k. Now, given a public w ∈ G, Alice privately selects a 1 ∈ G and publishes a subgroup B ⊆ C G (a 1 ) (we explain why computing B is easy). Similarly, Bob privately selects b 2 ∈ G and publishes a subgroup A ⊆ C G (b 2 ). Alice then selects a 2 ∈ A and sends w 1 = a 1 wa 2 to Bob, while Bob selects b 1 ∈ B and sends w 2 = b 1 wb 2 to Alice.
Thus, in the first transmission, say, the adversary faces the problem of finding a 1 , a 2 such that w 1 = a 1 wa 2 , where a 2 ∈ A, but there is no explicit indication of where to choose a 1 from. Therefore, before arranging something like a length attack in this case, the adversary would have to compute the centralizer C G (B) first (because a 1 ∈ C G (B)), which is usually a hard problem by itself.
The protocol
In this section we give a formal description of our protocol, but first we introduce one more piece of notation. As it is common in public key exchange based on abstract groups, when transmitting an element g ∈ G of a group, one actually uses its normal form N (g) which is a sequence of symbols uniquely defined for a given g. A specific way of constructing such a sequence depends, of course, on a particular platform group G which we discuss in subsequent sections of our paper.
Our protocol is the following sequence of steps.
Protocol:
(1) Alice chooses an element a 1 ∈ G of length l, chooses a subgroup of C G (a 1 ), and publishes its generators A = {α 1 , . . . , α k } (see the following subsection 2.1 for specifications).
(2) Bob chooses an element b 2 ∈ G of length l, chooses a subgroup of C G (b 2 ), and publishes its generators B = {β 1 , . . . , β m } (see the following subsection 2.1 for specifications). (3) Alice chooses a random element a 2 from β 1 , . . . , β m and sends the normal form P A = N (a 1 wa 2 ) to Bob. (4) Bob chooses a random element b 1 from α 1 , . . . , α k and sends the normal form
Since
2.1. Suggested values of parameters. We suggest to use the following values of parameters in the above protocol: G = B n , the group of braids on n strands (see our Section 4); n = 64; l = 1024. At Step (1) of the protocol Alice generates (a 1 , A) and at Step (2) Bob generates (b 2 , B), both using the algorithm from [7] for computing centralizers (actually, there is no need to compute the whole centralizer, just a couple of elements are sufficient).
Requirements on the platform group G
In this section we discuss possible attacks on the protocol described in the previous section, and also put together some requirements on the platform group G.
To break the protocol it is sufficient to find either Alice's or Bob's private key which may be accomplished as follows:
Attack on Alice's private key. Find an element a 1 which commutes with every element of the subgroup A and an element a 2 ∈ B , such that P A = N (a 1 wa 2 ). The pair (a 1 , a 2 ) is equivalent to (a 1 , a 2 ). (That means, a 1 wa 2 = a 1 wa 2 , and therefore the pair (a 1 , a 2 ) can be used by the adversary to get the shared secret key.) Attack on Bob's private key. Find an element b 1 ∈ A and an element b 2 which commutes with every element of the subgroup B , such that
Consider the attack on Alice's private key (the other one is similar). The most obvious way to carry out such an attack is the following: To make the protocol secure, we want both these problems to be computationally hard. For the problem (A2) to be hard, it is necessary for the centralizer C G (A) to be large. Otherwise, the adversary can use the "brute force" attack, i.e., enumerate all elements of C G (A) and find candidates for b 2 (assuming that the decisional membership problem in the subgroup B is efficiently solvable).
Thus the platform group G should satisfy at least the following properties in order for our key establishment protocol to be efficient and secure.
(P1) G should be a non-commutative group of exponential growth. The latter means that the number of elements of length n in G is exponential in n; this is needed to prevent attacks by complete exhaustion of the key space. , {a 1 , . . . , a k }) such that aa i = a i a for each i = 1, . . . , k. (Clearly, in this case the subgroup generated by a 1 , . . . , a k centralizes a). (P5) For a generic set {g 1 , . . . , g k } of elements of G it should be difficult to compute
(P6) Even if H = C(g 1 , . . . , g n ) is computed, it should be hard to find x ∈ H and y ∈ H 1 (where H 1 is some fixed subgroup given by a generating set) such that xwy = w , i.e., to solve the membership search problem for a double coset.
Braid groups
In this section we consider a particular class of groups, namely braid groups, which were a popular choice for the platform of various cryptographic protocols in the last 6-7 years, starting with the seminal paper [1] .
Let B n be the group of braids on n strands and X n = {x 1 , . . . , x n−1 } the set of standard generators. Thus,
For more information on braid groups, we refer to the monographs [2], [6] ; here we address the properties (P1)-(P6) from the previous section.
(P1) Braid groups B n are non-commutative groups of exponential growth if n ≥ 3. (P2) There are several known normal forms for elements of B n , including Garside normal form (see [2] ) and Birman-Ko-Lee normal form [3] . Both of these forms are efficiently computable (in quadratic time with respect to the length of a given element). (P3) There are quadratic time algorithms to multiply or invert normal forms of elements of B n . (P4) It is not so easy to compute the whole centralizer of an element g of G (cf. [11] ). The number of steps required to compute C G (g) is proportional to |SSS(g)|, the size of the "super summit set" of g, which is typically huge. Nevertheless, there are approaches to finding "large parts" of C G (g), e.g. one can generate a sufficiently large part of SSS(g) and pick several elements from there, see [11] for more details. (P5) For a generic subgroup A it is hard to compute C G (A). The complexity of such computation is proportional to |SS(A)|, the size of the summit set of A (see [7] ), which is typically huge. (P6) There is no known solution to the membership search problem for double cosets H · w · H in braid groups. This problem, in theory, appears to be much more complicated (for generic subgroups H and H ) than the conjugacy search problem.
Semantic security
In this section, we discuss semantic security of a cryptosystem that would be based on a shared key obtained in our protocol. Semantic security is the standard notion of security for encryption protocols, see [10] .
Security of the protocol described in our Section 2 is based on the assumption that the following problem is computationally hard:
Given the public information w, P A , and P B it is hard to compute the shared key K. This assumption is the computational assumption of the protocol. The stronger decisional version of this assumption would be:
Given w, P A , and P B , it is hard to distinguish the shared key K from a random element of the form awb. We should point out that without this decisional assumption, it may still be possible to design a semantically secure encryption protocol in the "random oracle model" the same way it was done in [15, Section 3.3], namely, by employing a hash function H : B n → {0, 1} k from the braid group to the message space. Still, it would be quite interesting to find out whether or not the shared key K obtained in our key establishment protocol can be directly used for semantically secure encryption.
The decisional assumption above appears to be wrong for most choices of w, P A and P B because of the following consideration. Since P A = a 1 wa 2 , we have a 1 = P A a −1 2 w −1 . Therefore, K = a 1 b 1 wb 2 a 2 = P A a −1 2 (w −1 P B )a 2 . Hence, K is a product of a public element P A and a public element w −1 P B conjugated by an element from a subgroup {β 1 , . . . , β k }.
It seems plausible that, for some choices of the keys, elements of this type can be distinguished from random elements of the form awb along the same lines it was done in [9] (in a different, but similar context). Indeed, if w −1 P B is not a pure braid, then it projects to a non-trivial permutation, call it ρ B , under the natural homomorphism π from the braid group B n onto the symmetric group S n . Then the conjugate permutation π(a 2 ) −1 ρ B π(a 2 ) has the same cyclic structure as ρ B does, and this gives away some information about the permutation π(K) = π(P A )π(a 2 ) −1 ρ B π(a 2 ); for example, from knowing π(P A ) and the cyclic structure of π(a 2 ) −1 ρ B π(a 2 ), one can get information about possible order of the permutation π(K).
If both P A and w −1 P B are pure braids, then it is possible to use other homomorphisms (e.g. pulling out a strand) to obtain some partial information; see [9] for details. If w −1 P B is a pure braid but P A is not, then, again, the homomorphism π reveals partial information about the shared key K.
